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Abstract— In this paper, we consider a secure distributed fil-
tering problem for linear time-invariant systems with bounded
noises and unstable dynamics under compromised observa-
tions. A malicious attacker is able to compromise a subset
of the agents and manipulate the observations arbitrarily.
We first propose a recursive distributed filter consisting of
two parts at each time. The first part employs a saturation-
like scheme, which gives a small gain if the innovation is
too large. The second part is a consensus operation of state
estimates among neighboring agents. A sufficient condition is
then established for the boundedness of estimation error, which
is with respect to network topology, system structure, and the
maximal compromised agent subset. We further provide an
equivalent statement, which connects to 2s-sparse observability
in the centralized framework in certain scenarios, such that
the sufficient condition is feasible. Numerical simulations are
finally provided to illustrate the developed results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are systems controlled and
monitored by computer-based algorithms. Through a CPS,
physical processes and cyber components can be effectively
integrated. During the recent years, numerous applications
of CPSs such as sensor network, vehicle network, process
control, smart grid, etc, have been well investigated in
academia and industry. With higher integration of large-
scale computer networks and complex physical processes,
the CPSs are confronting more security issues both in
software and physical layers. Thus, the research topics on
CPS security are attracting more and more attention.
In a CPS, sensor observations can be utilized to obtain
state estimate or to design output feedback signal to control
the physical process. Due to the vulnerabilities of sensors,
the attacker may insert faulty data into observations of the
compromised sensors. Then, the estimates or controller based
on the compromised observations will be unreliable, and
even bring tremendous damage to the whole system. Thus,
some detection and identification schemes are considered to
find out whether the sensors are under attack, and if so how to
identify the attack signals inserted to the systems. A study
on attack detection and identification for CPSs was given
in [1], where the design methods and analysis techniques
for centralized and distributed monitors were discussed as
well. In [2], the joint distributed attack detection and state
estimation was investigated in a Bayesian framework. To
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obtain attack-resilient state estimates, in the centralized
framework, some state estimators or observers were pro-
posed based on optimization techniques [3]–[7], recursive
implementation [8], and probabilistic approach [9]. Com-
pared with centralized methods, on one hand, the distributed
ones have advantages in quite a few aspects, such as the
structure robustness, energy saving and parallel processing.
On the other hand, in the distributed framework, since each
agent has limited information from local observations and
neighboring communications, the distributed state estima-
tion methods are essentially different from the centralized
ones. In the distributed state estimation under compromised
sensors, observer-based methods were studied for byzantine
attacks, under which the compromised sensors can send
faulty information to other normal sensors [10]. In [11], a
distributed observer with attack detection layer was proposed
to deal with a class of biasing attacks. Distributed estimation
for a static parameter under compromised observations was
studied in [12], where the sparse-observability condition was
required to guarantee the consistency of the estimator.
In this paper, we study the secure distributed filtering or
estimation problem for linear time-invariant systems with
bounded noises and unstable dynamics. The main contri-
butions of this paper are three-fold. 1) We investigate the
secure distributed filtering problem under compromised ob-
servations. Unlike [11], we allow that the malicious attacker
manipulates the observations arbitrarily for an unknown
subset of the agents. Different from [10], [13] requiring some
robustness of communication graph, we simply assume the
connectivity of the graph. 2) We propose a novel secure
distributed filtering framework consisting of two parts, which
is essentially different from the centralized methods [3]–[9]
or the distributed methods [10], [11]. The first part employs
a saturation-like scheme, which gives a small gain if the
innovation is too large. The second part is a consensus
operation of state estimates among neighboring agents. 3)
Different from the analysis methods for static parameter
estimation [12], [14], we provide a new analysis approach
for unstable system dynamics, and establish a sufficient
condition for the boundedness of estimation error. We further
provide an equivalent statement, which connects to 2s-
sparse observability in the centralized framework in certain
scenarios, such that the sufficient condition is feasible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II is on preliminaries and problem formulation. Section
III considers the secure distributed filter. Section IV provides
the performance analysis for the filter. Section V gives the
numerical simulation results. The conclusions of this paper
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are given in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notations
The superscript “T” represents the transpose. Rn×m is
the set of real matrices with n rows and m columns. Rn
is the n-dimensional Euclidean space. In stands for the n-
dimensional square identity matrix. 1N stands for the N -
dimensional vector with all elements being one. diag{·} rep-
resents the diagonalization operator. A⊗B is the Kronecker
product of A and B. ‖x‖2 is the 2-norm of a vector x. ‖A‖2
is the induced 2-norm, i.e., ‖A‖2 = sup
x 6=0
‖Ax‖2
‖x‖2 . λ2(A) and
λmax(A) are the second minimal eigenvalue and maximal
eigenvalue of A, respectively.
B. Graph Preliminaries
In an undirected graph G = (V, E), V stands for the set
of nodes, E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges. If there is an
edge (i, j) ∈ E , node i can exchange information with
node j, and node j is called a neighbor of node i. Let
the neighbor set of agent i be Ni := {j ∈ V|(i, j) ∈
E}. The graph G is connected if for any pair of nodes
(i1, il), there exists a path from i1 to il consisting of
edges (i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (il−1, il). L is the Laplacian ma-
trix whose definition is referred to [15]. On the connectivity
of a graph, we have
Proposition 1: [15] The undirected graph G is connected
if and only if λ2(L) > 0.
C. System model
Consider the following plant observed by N agents (e.g.,
sensors),
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + w(t)
yi(t) = Cix(t) + vi(t) + ai(t), i = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the unknown system state, w(t) ∈ Rn
is the process noise, vi(t) ∈ R is the observation noise, and
ai(t) ∈ R is the attack signal inserted by some malicious
attacker, all at time t. yi(t) ∈ R is the observation of agent
i. Moreover, A ∈ Rn×n is the system state transition matrix,
and Ci ∈ R1×n is the observation vector of agent i.
Remark 1: The essential problem is to study the influence
of scalar attack signal to the estimation performance with
certain number of compromised observation elements, like
[12]. Thus, we consider the observation equation with scalar
outputs for each agent. This conforms with the centralized
framework, where each row vector of centralized observation
matrix stands for the observation vector of one agent.
Definition 1: (One-step Collective Observability) The
system (1) is called one-step collectively observable if∑N
i=1 C
T
i Ci is a positive definite matrix.
Remark 2: On the relation between one-step collective
observability, which requires N ≥ n, and n-step collec-
tive observability (i.e., (A,C) is observable, where C =
[CT1 , . . . , C
T
N ]): If A is a diagonal matrix such as A = In, the
two definitions are equivalent. For general system matrices,
n-step collective observability is milder than the one-step
collective observability. Notice also that one-step collective
observability does not mean local observability, i.e., (A,Ci)
could be unobservable or undetectable, ∀i = 1, . . . , N .
In this paper, the following assumptions are in need.
Assumption 1: The following conditions hold
‖A‖2 = a ≥ 1, ‖w(t)‖2 ≤ bw, ‖vi(t)‖2 ≤ bv,
‖xˆi(0)− x(0)‖2 ≤ ηi ≤ η0, i = 1, · · · , N,
where xˆi(0) is the estimate of x(0) by agent i. Besides, the
bounds are known to each agent.
Assumption 2: The system (1) is one-step collectively
observable, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 C
T
i Ci  0. The observation vector
Ci is normalized, i.e., ‖Ci‖2 = 1, i = 1, · · · , N .
Assumption 3: The communication graph G = (V, E) is
undirected and connected, where V = {1, 2, . . . , N}
Remark 3: To design a non-trivial filtering algorithm with
guaranteed bounded estimator error, we assume ‖A‖2 ≥ 1 in
Assumption 1. Otherwise, one can easily design a filter such
that estimation errors keep bounded. The proposed methods
and results also apply to the case where ‖A‖2 < 1. Assump-
tion 2 requires a collective observability condition utilized
in the existing literature on distributed estimation [16]–
[18]. The normalized observation vectors can be obtained by
reconstructing the system (1). Different from [10] requiring
some robustness of communication graph, the connectivity
of Assumption 3 is a standard condition for distributed
estimation. If the graph is not connected, the problem can
be studied for the connected subgraphs separately.
A typical distributed filtering problem is to design an
online filter or state estimator for each agent (e.g., agent
i) to estimate the system state x(t) by employing the
known local noisy observations {yi(l)}tl=1 and the messages
received from neighboring agents. However, if observations
of some agents are compromised by a malicious attacker,
the observation quality may be tremendously affected, which
will bring big challenges in design and analysis of distributed
filtering algorithms. In the following, we introduce the attack
model.
D. Attack model
To deteriorate the estimation performance of filtering algo-
rithms, the malicious attacker aims to persistently destroy the
observation data of some targeted agents. However, due to
resource limitation, the attacker has limited power to attack
the set of agents. Assume that the set of compromised agents
is fixed over time, and consists of no more than s agents.
Since the knowledge of the attacker makes a big difference
to its ability in deteriorating the estimation performance, we
assume the following knowledge scope of the attacker.
Assumption 4: The attacker has full knowledge on the
system (1), the network topology, and the filter of all agents.
Furthermore, the observation yi(t) can be arbitrary for a
compromised agent i.
Under Assumption 4, we have
ai(t) ∈ R, i ∈ A, with |A| ≤ s
ai(t) = 0, i ∈ N = V −A,∀t ∈ N,
(2)
where A is the set of agents whose observations are com-
promised by the malicious attacker. N is the set of normal
agents without being affected by the attacker. Note that the
sets A and N are unknown to each agent.
Remark 4: In Assumption 4, we consider the worst sce-
nario on compromised observations that the attacker can
access the full information without requiring any concrete
attack models, which is more general than results in the
existing literature [11].
We further have the following definitions.
Definition 2: (s-sparse observability) The linear system
defined by (1) is said to be s-sparse observable if for every set
Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with |Γ| = s, the pair (A,CΓ¯) is observable,
where CΓ¯ is the remaining matrix by removing Cj , j ∈ Γ
from [CT1 , C
T
2 , . . . , C
T
N ].
Definition 3: (One-step s-sparse observability) The linear
system defined by (1) is said to be one-step s-sparse observ-
able if for every set Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with |Γ| = s, the pair
CT
Γ¯
CΓ¯ =
∑N
i=1,i/∈Γ C
T
i Ci  0, where CΓ¯ is the remaining
matrix by removing Cj , j ∈ Γ from [CT1 , CT2 , . . . , CTN ].
Remark 5: Definition 2 and Definition 3 correspond to the
n-step (collective) observability (i.e., (A,C) is observable)
and one-step (collective) observability in Definition 1. If the
system matrix A is diagonal, Definition 2 and Definition 3
are equivalent. In the centralized framework, if the obser-
vations of s agents are compromised, the system should be
2s-sparse observable to guarantee the effective estimation of
system state [19].
E. Problems of Interest
We mainly consider the following problems in this paper.
1) How to design secure distributed filter for each agent
by employing the local noisy observations potentially com-
promised by the malicious attacker?
2) What conditions can guarantee the bounded estimation
error of the distributed filter in presence of the attacker (2).
How can we quantify the estimation performance of the
distributed filter?
III. SECURE DISTRIBUTED FILTER:SDCF
In this section, we will design a secure distributed filter
for each agent.
We consider the filtering algorithm with two stages,
namely, observation update and consensus. In the stage of
local observation update, we design a saturation-like scheme
to utilize the observation yi(t) as follows
x˜i(t) =Axˆi(t− 1) + ki(t)CTi (yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)), (3)
where
ki(t) =
{
1, if |yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)| ≤ β,
β
|yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1)| , otherwise.
(4)
Different from the gain designs of common filters or
state estimators, the gain ki(t) in this work is related to
the value of innovation (i.e., yi(t) − CiAxˆi(t − 1)). The
design of ki(t) in (4) makes sense, since if the estimation
innovation is very large, the observation yi(t) is more likely
to be compromised. By the designed gain ki(t), we have
|ki(t)(yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t− 1))| ≤ β, which guarantee that the
attacker has limited influence to the local update stage of the
filter.
In the consensus stage, we suppose that each agent can
communicate with its neighbors for L ≥ 1 times between
two time instants. For l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
xˆi,l(t) = xˆi,l−1(t)− α
∑
j∈Ni
(xˆi,l−1(t)− xˆj,l−1(t)), (5)
with xˆi,0(t) = x˜i(t) and we denote xˆi(t) = xˆi,L(t). For each
communication, agent j will transmit its estimate xˆj,l−1(t)
to its neighbors, l = 1, . . . , N.
Remark 6: The parameter β in (4) reflects the usage
tradeoff between normal observations and compromised
observations. If β is very large, then almost all normal
observations will be utilized without scaling. But, it will
give much space that the attacker can use to deteriorate the
estimation performance. If β is very small, although the most
possible attack signals may be filtered by the designed gain
ki(t), many normal observations will contribute little to the
estimation performance. As a result, the filtering error of
each agent will probably be divergent. The condition on β
will be discussed in next section.
Remark 7: The term α
∑
j∈Ni(xˆi,l−1(t) − xˆj,l−1(t)) is
to make the agents reach consensus. The consensus step is
vital to guarantee bounded estimation error of distributed
filters especially for the case that each subsystem is not
observable (i.e., (A,Ci) is not observable). The parameter
α can increase the consensus speed if it is well designed. It
can be proven that if the consensus step L goes to infinity
and the parameter α is properly designed, then the estimates
{xˆi(t)}Ni=1 will converge to the same vector. However, the
consensus step L is not required to approximate infinity in
this work. The requirement of the step L and the design of α,
related with the system structure and performance demand,
is given in next section.
By (3), (4) and (5), we obtain the secure distributed
consensus filter (SDCF) in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secure Distributed Consensus Filter (SDCF):
1: Update: Agent i uses its own observation to update the
estimate
x˜i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1) + ki(t)CTi (yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1))
ki(t) = min{1, β|yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1)|},
2: Consensus for L steps: xˆi,0(t) = x˜i(t)
For lth consensus, l = 1, . . . , L:
For ith agent, i = 1, . . . , N :
Agent i receives xˆj,l−1(t), j = 1, . . . ,Ni, then
xˆi,l(t) = xˆi,l−1(t)−α
∑
j∈Ni(xˆi,l−1(t)−xˆj,l−1(t))
end
end
3: Output step: xˆi(t) = xˆi,L(t).
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will focus on performance analysis of
the proposed SDCF algorithm. Specifically, we will study the
conditions to guarantee the boundedness of estimation error,
and quantify the estimation performance under compromised
observations.
For convenience, we denote
X(t) = 1N ⊗ x(t),
Y (t) =
[
yT1 (t), . . . , y
T
N (t)
]T
,
V (t) =
[
vT1 (t), . . . , v
T
N (t)
]T
,
Xˆ(t) =
[
xˆT1 (t), . . . , xˆ
T
N (t)
]T
, (6)
C¯ = diag{C1, . . . , CN},
K¯(t) = diag{k1(t), . . . , kN (t)},
PNn =
1
N
(1N ⊗ In)(1N ⊗ In)T .
By (3), (5) and (6), for i = 1, . . . , N , we obtain the compact
form of recursive state estimates of SDCF in the following
Xˆ(t) = (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L
[
(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1)
+ C¯T K¯(t)(Y (t)− C¯(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1))
]
, (7)
where L is the Laplacian matrix. Define E(t) = Xˆ(t) −
1N ⊗ x(t), noting (L⊗ In)(1N ⊗ x(t)) = 0, then we obtain
the error dynamics as follows
E(t)
= (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L
[
(INn − C¯T K¯(t)C¯)(IN ⊗A)E(t− 1)
+ (C¯T K¯(t)C¯ − INn)(IN ⊗ w(t− 1)) + C¯T K¯(t)V (t)
+ C¯T K¯(t)a(t)
]
, (8)
where a(t) = diag{a1(t), a2(t), . . . , aN (t)}.
Remark 8: Since the filtering gain K¯(t) is related to the
state estimates and potential compromised observations, the
common stability analysis approaches, such as Lyapunov
methods, may not be directly utilized to analyze the stability
or boundedness of estimation error E(t) by its dynamics (8).
This is the main challenge for the problem of distributed
recursive filter under compromised observations.
A. Boundedness of estimation error
In this subsection, we will study the conditions to guar-
antee the boundedness of estimation error for the SDCF in
Algorithm 1. Denote λ0 := λmin
(∑
i∈N∗ C
T
i Ci
)
, where
N ∗ is the agent set such that λmin
(∑
i∈N C
T
i Ci
)
is minimal
within all sets {N} obtained by removing any |A| agents
from V . Besides, for convenience, we give the following
notations
γ =
λmax(L)− λ2(L)
λmax(L) + λ2(L) ,
p∗0 = aγ
L
√
Nη0 +
√
NβγL
1− aγL ,
k∗ = min{1, β
a(p∗0 + η0) + bw + bv
},
µ0 = a
(
1− k
∗
N
λ0
)
, (9)
Q0 = (1− |A|
N
)(bw + bv + ap
∗
0) + bw,
ϑ0 = 1− Q0
η0
(
1− β|A|
Nη0
)−1
,
m0 = ϑ0
(
1− β|A|
Nη0
)(
1− k
∗λ0
N
)−1
.
On the boundedness of estimation error by SDCF in Algo-
rithm 1, we have the following result.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1 - 3 hold and α =
2
λ2(L)+λmax(L) . If there exist a set of scalars L > 0, β > 0,
η0 > 0, such that
1 ≤ a < min{m0, γ−L} , (10)
then the estimation error of SDCF(L, β), i.e., ei(t) = xˆi(t)−
x(t), ∀i ∈ V , satisfies
lim
t→∞ ‖ei(t)‖2 ≤
NQ0 + |A|β
N(1− µ0) +
√
NβγL
1− aγL <∞. (11)
Remark 9: The parameters β, L are given in the imple-
mentation of algorithm. Although η0 is a bound of initial
estimation error, we can adjust it bigger to meet the require-
ment.
Remark 10: Theorem 1 shows that by taking proper pa-
rameters L, β, η0, the SDCF can guarantee the boundedness
of estimator error for a class of unstable dynamics. The con-
dition (10) can be examined offline with global knowledge
to provide the parameter design.
B. Feasibility of Condition (10)
Since the condition (10) is complex, its feasiblity needs to
be testified, i.e., whether there exists a set of positive param-
eters L, β, η0 such that (10) is satisfied. In this subsection,
we study the feasibility of (10).
Theorem 2: Condition (10) has a feasible solution on
β, η0 and L, if and only if
λ0 > |A|. (12)
Remark 11: Recall λ0 := λmin
(∑
i∈N∗ C
T
i Ci
)
, which
reflects the one-step sparse observability of the system by
removing any |A| agents. Since the compromised subset of
agents is fixed over time, we can calculate λ0 and compare
it with |A|.
The direct relationship between (12) and the one-step
sparse observability is given in the following.
Lemma 1: A necessary condition to guarantee λ0 > s :=
|A| is that the system (1) is one-step 2s-sparse observable.
If the observation vectors are orthogonal and A is a diag-
onal matrix, then one-step 2s-sparse observability is also a
sufficient condition to guarantee λ0 > |A|.
Remark 12: From Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, on Algo-
rithm 1, we have that if the observations of any s agents are
under attacks, the system (1) should be one-step 2s-sparse
observable to achieve the effective estimation of system state.
For the case that A is a diagonal matrix, the condition (12)
conforms to the centralized framework that the system is
2s-sparse observable [19].
C. Proof of Theorem 1
In this subsection, we provide the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2: The following equation holds
(INn − α(L ⊗ In)− PNn)LMt
= (INn − α(L ⊗ In))LMt,
where Mt = (IN ⊗ A)(Xˆ(t) − 1N ⊗ xavg(t)), xˆavg(t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xˆi(t).
The following lemma provides an optimal design for
the consensus parameter α, which is related to the graph
topology.
Lemma 3: Under Assumption 3, the following result
holds
min
α
‖INn − α(L ⊗ In)− PNn‖2 =
λmax(L)− λ2(L)
λmax(L) + λ2(L) < 1,
with the optimal solution α∗ = 2λ2(L)+λmax(L) .
The following lemma studies the influence of consensus
step L to the observation innovation part of (7).
Lemma 4: Let α = 2λ2(L)+λmax(L) , then the following
result holds∥∥∥(INn − PNn) (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L Y¯ (t)∥∥∥
2
≤
√
NγLβ,
where Y¯ (t) = C¯T K¯(t)(Y (t)− C¯(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1)).
Let ei(t) be the estimation error of agent i by the filter in
Algorithm 1, i.e., ei(t) = xˆi(t)−x(t). Then we have ei(t) =
xˆi(t)−x(t) = e˜(t)+ e¯i(t), where e¯i(t) := xˆi(t)− xˆavg, and
e˜(t) = xˆavg − x(t), and xˆavg(t) := 1N
∑N
i=1 xˆi(t). The idea
to analyze the boundedness of estimation error ei(t) is to find
conditions that can guarantee the boundedness of e¯i(t) and
e˜(t) simultaneously. As a result, the boundedness of ei(t)
can be guaranteed. In the following, Lemma 5 and Lemma
6 study the boundedness of e¯i(t) and e˜(t), respectively.
Lemma 5: Consider Algorithm 1 with L ≥ 1, and let
Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. If α = 2λ2(L)+λmax(L) , and ‖A‖2 =
a < γ−L, then
‖e¯i(t)‖2 ≤ p∗(L, t), (13)
where p∗(L, t) = (aγL)t
√
Nη0 +
√
NβγL 1−a
t−1γL(t−1)
1−aγL .
Furthermore, supt≥1{p∗(L, t)} ≤ aγL
√
Nη0 +
√
NβγL
1−aγL ,
p∗0 <∞, and
lim
L→∞
p∗(L, t) = 0,
lim
t→∞ p
∗(L, t) =
√
NβγL
1− aγL <∞.
(14)
Remark 13: Lemma 5 shows that the error between each
state estimate and the average estimates can be upper
bounded by p∗(L, t), which is uniformly upper bounded by a
constant scalar p∗0 and has some asymptotic properties w.r.t.
consensus step L and time t.
Lemma 6: Consider Algorithm 1 with L ≥ 1, and assume
that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold, α = 2λ2(L)+λmax(L) , and
‖A‖2 = a < γ−L. If
|A|β +NQ0
Nη0
≤ 1− µ0, (15)
then
lim
t→∞ ‖e˜(t)‖2 ≤
NQ0 + |A|β
N(1− µ0) . (16)
Remark 14: Lemma 6 provides the sufficient condition
to guarantee the boundedness of network tracking error (i.e.,
xˆavg(t) − x(t)). For given bw, bv, λ0 and a, we can design
β and L based on the condition (15) to guarantee (16).
From (10) and aγL < 1, we can have the condition
(15). By Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and the notations in (9), the
conclusion of Theorem 1 holds.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we carry out a numerical simulation to
show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
Regarding the system (1), we assume A = [ 1.01 0.10.1 1.1 ] with
‖A‖2 = 1.16. The observation vectors are randomly selected
from the set
{
C1 = [1, 0], C2 = [0, 1], C3 = [
√
2
2 ,
√
2
2 ]
}
. The
process noise w(t) and observation noises vi(t), i =
1, . . . , N , all follow the uniform distribution between [0, 1].
The bounds are assumed to be bv = 1, bw = 1, ηi =
1, i = 1, . . . , N. We suppose the time t = [0, 100] with
sampling interval 1. The sparse network given in Fig. 1 has
N = 100 nodes with λ2(L) = 4.1 and λmax(L) = 21.3.
We choose β = 3, the times of Monto Carlo experiments is
100. Suppose that the attacker will insert the signal ai(t) =
2(Cix(t) + vi(t)) if agent i is compromised.
We carry out the numerical simulation by employing the
SDCF to study its estimation performance under the above
setting. For one realization with consensus step L = 8
and the number of compromised agents 25, we obtain the
network tracking performance in Fig. 2. It shows that each
element of the system state, i.e., x1(t) and x2(t), can be well
estimated by agents over the network with small bounded
estimation error. The influence of consensus step L to the
mean values (averaged by 100) of maximal errors among all
agents is studied in Fig. 3 with the number of compromised
agents 25, which shows that a bigger consensus step can
lead to smaller estimation error. In Fig. 4 with L = 4, we
investigate the influence of compromised agent number to
the estimation error. We see that with the increasing of com-
promised number, the estimation errors will become larger,
and even diverge when the number is 66. The phenomena
conform with former analysis, since not enough information
can support an effective estimator if too many agents are
compromised. Based on the above results, the utility of the
proposed SDCF is validated.
Fig. 1. A random sparse connected graph with 100 nodes.
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Fig. 2. Network tracking performance for each element over one realiza-
tion.
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Fig. 3. The influence of consensus step to error norm dynamics.
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Fig. 4. The influence of compromised agent number to error norm
dynamics.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the secure distributed filtering problem
for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noises and
unstable dynamics under compromised observations. We
considered a general case that a malicious attacker can com-
promise a subset of agents and manipulate the observations
arbitrarily. First, we proposed a consensus-based distributed
filter by employing a saturation-like scheme, which gives a
small gain if the innovation is too large. Then, we provided
a sufficient condition to guarantee the boundedness of es-
timation error by each agent. The feasibility condition was
analyzed through an equivalent statement, which connects
to 2s-sparse observability in the centralized framework in
certain scenarios.
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